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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
v. * 
AARON T. BRANDLEY, * Case No. 970421-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. * 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
Should the Per Se Reversal rule in State v. Brown apply 
to privately retained counsel? 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will uphold the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial unless it 
determines the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. 
Boone, 820 P.2d 930 (Utah App. 1991). 
POINT II 
Has Appellant failed to establish a conflict of 
interest that resulted in actual prejudice? 
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Standard of Review: Findings of Fact are reviewed by an appellate 
court under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena, 8 69 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) . 
POINT III 
Were the statements of Appellant given to the 
investigating officer involuntary and in violation of 
his rights? 
Standard of Review: Findings of Fact are reviewed by an appellate 
court under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena, 8 69 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules 
are referenced in Appellant's brief and addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted by jury trial of five counts of 
Gross Lewdness, each a class A misdemeanor. The crimes were 
alleged to have occurred in Clearfield City, Davis County. 
Appellant was represented by privately retained trial counsel. 
Prior to trial Appellant moved to suppress statements made 
to a police detective. The motion was denied and. the court made 
written findings of fact. 
After trial but before sentencing, Appellant discharged his 
attorney and through his current appellate counsel moved for a 
new trial based on Appellant's discovery that his trial counsel 
2 
had associates in his law office who had prosecutorial functions 
in Uinta City, Weber County. The motion for new trial was denied 
and the court again made written findings of fact. This appeal 
was taken seeking a reversal of Appellant's convictions based on 
the same issues raised in the two motions. 
Appellant was a student teacher at Clearfield High School. 
At the trial five teenage high school females testified that a 
clean-cut young adult male touched them in the crotch area while 
walking in the halls. Each witness identified the Appellant in 
court as being the one who touched her (R. 154, 198, 223,255, 
277) . 
The statements that Appellant sought to have suppressed 
consisted of a response when the detective told him five high 
school girls had identified him as the person who had touched 
them. Appellant's response was that he didn't believe there had 
been five (R. 288, 291). The officer described the touching as 
having "scooped" them. When Appellant said he didn't scoop them, 
the detective said "I didn't mean scooped, I mean that your, that 
the hand was in a scoop position." Appellant said that was 
possible (R.288, 289). The detective asked Appellant why he had 
done it and he replied he didn't know but that he knew it had to 
stop (R.289). 
The Detective's interview took place in the office in the 
front of the school (R. 12). The room was about 10 by 12 feet 
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(R.12). Appellant was accompanied to the room by an 
administrator who introduced him to the detective (R.13). The 
administrator left the room closing the door. Appellant was 
seated closer to the door than the Appellant (R.13). The door 
was not locked (R.13). The interview lasted ten to fifteen 
minutes (R. 15,367). The officer never raised his voice, 
displayed handcuffs, gun or badge, though he did identify himself 
as a police officer (R.18). Appellant provided an affidavit 
describing the officer's interrogation: 
The officer said words to the effect that scooping was 
not a big deal, "you can tell me about what you did," 
that when I was in school we called scooping a "cheap 
feel." He acted like he was my friend, so I should 
confide in him that I had touched the young women. 
(Affidavit paragraph 8). 
The detective had not focused his investigation on the 
Appellant at the time of the interview. He had spoken to another 
officer over the phone about the incident but had not interviewed 
any of the girls (R.10). He understood that four of the girls 
had identified a student teacher as the suspect and a fifth had 
specifically identified Appellant (R. 25). The detective's mind 
was still open at the time to looking at other teachers or people 
(R.19). 
For purposes of Appellant's motion for new trial, the 
prosecution stipulated that trial counsel's associates were 
prosecutors in Uinta City (R. 444). There is no stipulation 
about South Weber City. Nor is there any evidence that the Court 
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or the prosecutor were aware of the conflict at the time of the 
trial. The only evidence that Trial counsel knew of his 
associates conflict is the statement given by Appellate counsel 
at the time of the motion hearing (R 444). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Appellant's privately retained counsel did not 
disclose to appellant, the court or the prosecutor that members 
of his firm performed prosecutorial functions in a small city in 
another county. The Per Se reversal rule of State v. Brown, 853 
P.2d 851 should not apply to this circumstance because it is a 
circumstance that was not avoidable by the prosecution or the 
court. Imposition of the Per Se rule therefore would have no 
prophylactic effect unless courts made an on the record inquiry 
into the potential conflicts of every defense attorney in every 
case. 
Point II: The court heard appellants motion for a new trial 
and found that he had not been prejudiced by the conflict and 
that Defense Counsel's performance had been vigorous and 
effective. The appellate court should defer to those findings. 
Point III: The court heard Appellant's motion to suppress 
his statements made to a police officer without a Miranda 
warning. The court made findings of fact that the statements 
were voluntary and defendant was not in custody nor were the 
statements made under circumstances requiring Miranda. The 
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appellate court should defer to those findings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PER SE REVERSAL RULE IN STATE V. BROWN SHOULD NOT 
APPLY TO PRIVATELY RETAINED COUNSEL. 
Defendant relies principally upon the case of State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (1992). Brown is limited in scope to public 
defender representation: 
Thus, it is clear that conflicts of interest inhere 
whenever a city prosecutor is appointed to represent an 
indigent defendant. Brown at 858 (emphasis added). 
The stated purpose of the court creating a per se rule of 
reversal is to create a prophylactic rule to prevent government 
from contracting with appointed counsel that also do prosecution 
work. The per se rule would be ineffective in preventing private 
counsel from representing both defendants and prosecution 
agencies. 
Consequently, we hold that defendant's right to the 
undivided loyalty of counsel was jeopardized. Because 
a concrete showing of prejudice would be very difficult 
to make when a prosecutor is appointed to assist in the 
defense of the accused, we conclude that it is 
unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case 
inquiry to weigh actual prejudice. Instead, we 
announce a per se rule of reversal wherever such a dual 
representation is undertaken so as to prevent its 
recurrence. Brown at 859 (emphasis added). 
A subsequent case, State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350 (Utah 
1996), reiterates the limitation "...our decision in Brown 
announced for the first time that counsel with concurrent 
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prosecutorial duties could not represent indigent defendants..." 
Gordon at 354 (emphasis added). That case further emphasized the 
prophylactic purpose behind the ruling, M(t)he primary purpose of 
the prohibition in Brown was clearly prophylactic..." Gordon at 
354. 
The court in Gordon emphasized that Brown represented an 
exercise of the court's supervisory power over the trial court. 
The record is totally devoid of any evidence that either the 
court or the prosecutor had any knowledge that defense counsel 
had associates with prosecutorial duties. A rule of per se 
reversal applied to those circumstances makes no sense. Neither 
the court nor the prosecutor could have foreseen or avoided the 
conflict absent a blanket requirement for an inquiry into all 
conflicts of each and every private defense attorney prior to 
trial. 
Although trial courts need not investigate every 
possible nuance surrounding a potential conflict of 
interest, nor do they have an affirmative duty to 
initiate an investigation into such matters when not 
raised, when an issue is raised, the court must make 
sufficient investigation to adequately ascertain that 
no material conflict exists. State v. Velarde, 806 
P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991). 
This court has held in a dual representation case, which is 
a more direct conflict of interest than seen here, that the per 
se rule does not apply if the trial court could not have 
reasonably known about the conflict: 
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Although his motion for new trial could be regarded as 
sufficient to preserve for consideration in this direct 
appeal his ineffectiveness of counsel claim arising 
from counsel's representation of purportedly 
conflicting interests (citations omitted), it was 
untimely for purposes of invoking the Holloway 
automatic reversal rule, which is based on a trial 
judge's failure to act once on notice that there was a 
possible conflict of interests between jointly 
represented codefendants. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 
at 75 (Utah App. 1990) referencing Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 
(1978). 
In Webb this court held: 
...the record in this case discloses an insufficient 
basis on which to hold that the trial court reasonably 
should have known before or at trial that the two SLLDA 
attorneys were representing codefendants with 
conflicting interests. We therefore conclude that the 
sixth amendment imposed no affirmative duty on the 
trial judge to act sua sponte and appoint Webb a non-
SLLDA attorney or inquire into the propriety of the 
representation of the codefendants by two public 
defenders from the same office. Webb at 75. 
Appellant argues that because trial counsel's representation 
of appellant violated an advisory opinion of the State Bar, the 
per se rule should apply. The Court of Appeals has held that a 
conflict of interest in a criminal case does not result in an 
automatic reversal, but results in a cause for disciplinary 
proceedings by the bar: 
In State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1990). This 
court said that a criminal defendant "is not 
automatically entitled to a reversal of his conviction" 
merely because of an apparent violation of a rule of 
professional conduct. Id. At 400. If Farr violated 
any ethical rules, the "appropriate remedy lies with 
the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar." State v. 
Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah 1992). 
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Defendant relies on an advisory opinion of the Ethics 
Advisory Opinion Committee of the Utah State Bar. A review of 
the Rules of Procedure of the committee reveals that such 
opinions "...may not be binding on the Utah Supreme Court or 
other courts of law." Paragraph VIII. 
The opinion therefore should not be viewed as 
persuasive authority on the issue of whether a per se reversal is 
appropriate. Such weight was neither intended not contemplated 
in the issuance of the opinion. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY CONFLICT IN 
INTEREST THAT RESULTED IN ACTUAL PREJUDICE. 
The court in Gordon pointed out the difference between the 
alleged conflict in this case and the direct conflict that 
arises by one attorney representing to defendants with 
conflicting defenses: 
The dissent relies upon cases in which the conflict of 
interest arose out of joint representation of multiple 
defendants, where, for example, one codefendant elected 
to plead guilty and testify against another. See State 
v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980). This 
represents a direct conflict of interest. However, the 
conflict of interest faced by an appointed defense 
counsel who also has concurrent prosecutorial duties in 
another jurisdiction is much more remote. Here, where 
Gordon was convicted in a trial conducted before we 
issued Brown, we should require Gordon to show 
ineffective assistance of his defense attorney. 
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(Citation omitted) This represents a direct conflict of 
interest. However, the conflict of interest faced by 
an appointed defense counsel who also has concurrent 
prosecutorial duties in another jurisdiction is much 
more remote. Gordon at 355. 
The court then went on to outline the proper standard of 
review: 
To demonstrate that his defense counsel's assistance 
was so inadequate as to constitute lack of counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment, Gordon must show that (1) 
his counsel's performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) 
he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. State 
v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113-14 (Utah 1994) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-94, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). These factors are 
not applied as a mechanical test but are meant to help 
us answer the ultimate questions of whether the 
"defendant received a fair trial." State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) . 
Appellant in this case has elected not to make an attempt to 
show the second prong in a Strickland analysis. He argues only 
that no prejudice needs to be shown. Yet even the case Appellant 
cites as authority requires a showing that the conflict adversely 
affected his counsel's performance. 
A defendant who did not object to the conflict at trial 
has the burden on appeal of demonstrating with 
specificity that "an actual conflict of interest 
existed which adversely affected his (or her) lawyer's 
performance." State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
Other cases point to an appellant's burden to show an 
impairment of his interests: 
To succeed on a claim of conflict of interest, 
defendant must "point to specific instances in the 
record to suggest an actual conflict or impairment of 
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his or her interests." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 75 
(Utah App. 1990). Defendant cannot claim error based 
on the mere appearance or hypothetical existence of 
conflict. Id. State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 212(Utah 
App. 1991). 
The trial court below heard the evidence at trial and found 
as a finding of fact that Appellant was well represented and was 
not prejudiced by the fact that his attorney had associates who 
represented a city in another county as city prosecutors. That 
finding should not be disturbed by this court absent a finding of 
clear error. 
POINT III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT 
FINDING THAT THE STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT WERE VOLUNTARY 
AND NOT IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS. 
The Utah Supreme Court set the standard for determining 
whether an investigative interview required a Miranda warning in 
State v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983): 
The court in State v. Riffle, 131 Ariz. 65, 638 P.2d 
732 (1981), restated four of the most important factors 
in determining whether an accused who has not been 
formally arrested is in custody. They are: (1) the 
site of the investigation; (2) whether the 
investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the 
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the 
length and form of interrogation. earner at 1171. 
The trial court in this case was fully briefed on the earner 
standards and cited to them in its written Memorandum of 
Decision: 
In this case the Court makes the following findings: 
(1) That the site of Defendant's interrogation was 
friendly, not hostile. It was the place where he 
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worked. His administrative superior asked him to come 
to a room at the school, and he came voluntarily. 
(2) That although the investigation had focused to some 
degree on Defendant, it had not, until the conclusion 
of the interrogation, progressed to the point that the 
police had probable cause to arrest him. 
(3) That objective indicia of arrest were almost 
totally absent. The officer was in civilian clothes, 
had a badge on his belt that may or may not have been 
seen by Defendant, had no handcuffs and his gun was not 
visible. The door was not locked. Defendant was one 
on one with the officer. 
(4) That the interrogation was brief, lasting 
approximately 15 minutes. It was casual and 
conversational rather than accusatory or threatening. 
The Defendant's characterization of the interview was 
that the officer tried to inveigle, cajole and 
persuade. There is no claim that he was overbearing or 
intimidating. 
Those findings are supported by the evidence and this court 
should defer to those findings absent a showing of clear error 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court 
under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing 
court to find clear error, it must decide that the 
factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolving all 
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's determination. Pena at 935-936. 
(Citations omitted). 
Even if the court finds the trial court erred in refusing to 
suppress the statements made to the detective, any such error was 
harmless in view of the strength of the State's evidence. In 
this case the State had five witnesses who testified to five 
independent incidents and all five identified the Appellant as 
the perpetrator. 
"An erroneous decision by a trial court cannot result 
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in reversible error unless the error is harmful." State 
v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997). 
"Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. Put 
differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood 
of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it 
undermines our confidence Tin the verdict." Id. State 
v. Piansiaksone, 337 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 1998). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant received a fair trial free from violation of his 
right to effective counsel. Appellant's convictions should 
therefore be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the ,-~J/ day of June, 1998. 
M 
J. /Namba 
Deputy^Bavis County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee, with postage prepaid thereon, to 
Kent E. Snider, Attorney for Appellant, at 2564 Washington Blvd., 
Ogden, UT 84401, this <^??^day of June, 1998. 
Secretary " 
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ADDENDUM 
MICHAEL V. HOUTZ, #5854 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
AMERICA FIRST BUILDING 
4768 HARRISON BOULEVARD 
OGDEN, UTAH 84403 
TELEPHONE: (801)479-4777 
IN THE LAYTON CIRCUIT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AARON BRANDLEY, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF AARON BRANDLEY 
Case No.: 961000783 
Judge Roger K. Bean 
County of Weber ) 
:ss 
State of Utah ) 
1. I am the Defendant in the above entitled matter• 
2. On April 2, 1996, I was in my school room preparing for 
the day at Clearfield High School. I was a student teacher at the 
school. 
3. A school administrator came to the room and asked if I 
had a few minutes to go with him. I told him I was preparing for 
the day but I would go with him for a few minutes. 
4. At no time did the school administrator tell me why he 
wanted me or who I was going to see. 
5. The school administrator took me to his office and had me 
go in. The person in the office closed the door and identified 
himself as a police officer, Inspector Holthaus. There was no 
other person in the room with us. 
6. He then asked me if I knew why I was asked to come and 
speak with him. I told him I did not know. He told me that five 
girls at Clearfield high had been touched in their groin area and 
they identified me as the person who "scooped" them. 
7. I denied any involvement, and I told him I had no idea 
what scooped meant. The police officer got up out of the chair and 
showed me what scooping was and told me that a law had been passed 
recently in Davis County prohibiting scooping. I indicated that I 
had never done such a thing to anyone in my life. 
8. The officer said words to the effect that scooping was 
not a big or bad deal, "you can tell me about what you did," that 
when I was in school we called scooping a "cheap feel." He acted 
like he was my friend, so I should confide in him that I had 
touched the young women. 
9. I told him I had never in my life touched anybody in that 
manner. 
10. The officer then asked if I ever intentionally touched 
the five female students in an inappropriate manner. I told him I 
had not. 
11. The officer then asked me how I walk and questioned 
whether I walk with my arms swinging. I said that I did walk with 
my arms swinging but so does every other person. 
12. The officer asked if I unintentionally brushed by the 
students. I indicated that the halls are crowded, and it is 
possible that I unintentionally could have brushed against any 
student in the school when the halls are crowded. 
13. The officer then stood up and told me I had been very 
cooperative. He opened the door for me to leave. He briefly said 
something to the school administrator and left. 
14. The school administrator asked if I had any personal 
belongings in the school. I had my lunch there. He took me to get 
my lunch and requested that I leave the school grounds. 
15. Several days later I learned that the police officer said 
I had confessed to crimes alleged in this case. I never did. 
16. I was never given Miranda warnings at any time during the 
interrogation by the police officer. 
DATED this H day of August, 1996. 
CU jQtr 
fron B r a n d l e y , D e f e n d a n t 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s \°\ day of A u g u s t , 
1996 . 
Na o t a r y P u b l i c 
K , • X " v ; : r ^ ••'""•VTS.OT I T A H I 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
On this day of August, 1996, I deposited in the U.S, 
Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Aaron 
Brandley to the following: 
Layton Circuit Court 
Clerk of the Court 
425 North Wasatch Drive 
Layton UT 84040 
Brian Namba 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
800 West State Street 
Farmington UT 84025 
Tauna I. Mazeika 
Legal Secretary 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, Case No. 961000783 
v. Date 10-25-96 
AARON T. BRANDLEY. 
Defendant Judge Bean 
MATTER: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
From a review of the testimony of Inspector Holthaus and Defendant's affidavit 
testimony, the Court concludes that the officer's questioning of Defendant was not 
custodial, and denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
In Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 11 68 (Utah 1983), the Court quoted wi th 
approval from two Arizona cases. In referring to the first, State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. 
App. 2 5 1 , 431 P.2d 6 9 1 , 25 A.L.R. 3d 1063 (1967), it said: 
. . . the court opted for the rule that the Miranda warning need 
not be given until police have both reasonable grounds to 
believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable 
grounds to believe that the defendant committed it. Said the 
court: 
We believe that the point where the warning must be 
given is when the two generally coincide, for from that 
point forward the police can be expected to pursue the 
case against the defendant wi th vigor. The police must 
have focused generally upon the crime so that they 
would have caused [sic] for arrest without a warrant. 
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. . . The time for caution is when the arrest could be 
made. Everything prior to that time may be considered 
"the general on the scene questioning" which is 
permissible under Miranda. 
In referring to the second, the Court said: 
The court in State v. Riffle, 131 Ariz. 65, 638 P.2d 732 
(1981), restated four of the most important factors in 
determining whether an accused who has not been formally 
arrested is in custody. They are: (1) the site of interrogation; 
(2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) 
whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the 
length and form of interrogation. Applying that test to the 
instant case, the field sobriety tests were requested and taken 
on a public street. Moreover, no indicia of arrest such as 
readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns were present 
when the officer asked the defendant to perform the field 
sobriety tests. Also, the length of the performance of the tests 
was only minutes, a relatively short period of time. These 
factors do not suggest a custodial setting. The environment 
may have been authoritative but it certainly was not coercive or 
compelling. 
In State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court, 
quoting wi th approval from Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 , 82 L. Ed. 2d 
317 , 104 S. Ct. 3138, said: 
The standard for determining when a defendant is "in 
custody" for Miranda purposes is well-settled. "[T]he 
safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as 
a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree 
associated with formal arrest. '" Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 
(quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 , 1125, 77 L. Ed. 
2d 1275, 103 S. Ct. 3517 (1983) (per curiam)); see also State 
v. East, 743 P.2d 1 2 1 1 , 1212 (Utah 1987). More specifically, 
Miranda warnings are required whenever the circumstances of 
an interrogation are such that they "exert[] upon [the] detained 
person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his 
privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned 
of his constitutional r ights." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437 , 104 
S.Ct. at 3149. 
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In this case, the Court makes these findings: 
(1) That the site of Defendant's interrogation was friendly, not hostile. It was 
the place where he worked. His administrative superior asked him to come to 
a room at the school, and he came voluntarily. 
(2) That although the investigation had focused to some degree on Defendant, 
it had not, until the conclusion of the interrogation, progressed to the point 
that the police had probable cause to arrest him. 
(3) That objective indicia of arrest were almost totally absent. The officer 
was in civilian clothes, had a badge on his belt that may or may not have been 
seen by Defendant, had no handcuffs and his gun was not visible. The door 
was not locked. Defendant was one on one with the officer. 
(4) That the interrogation was brief, lasting approximately 15 minutes. It was 
casual and conversational rather than accusatory or threatening. The 
Defendant's characterization of the interview was that the officer tried 
to inveigle, cajole and persuade. There is no claim that he was overbearing or 
intimidating. 
The police did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Defendant was the one 
who committed the offense until Defendant had responded to the questions put to 
him in the interrogation. 
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MATTER: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
The basis of Defendant's Motion is that the lawyer he retained to represent him at 
trial was a member of a firm that employed two other lawyers who were part time 
prosecutors for the Town of Uintah. Defendant argues that this is an obvious 
conflict of interest which necessitates setting aside his conviction and granting a 
new trial. 
Defendant brings his Motion under Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which reads: 
The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new 
trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
Rule 30(a) of the Criminal Rules is also pertinent: 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
Defendant's principal reliance is on State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), 
which held that court-appointed defense counsel who was also a part-time 
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prosecutor in a different jurisdiction constituted an inherent conflict of interest 
requiring reversal. The Utah Supreme Court said: 
Although we do not decide whether it is constitutionally 
impermissible to appoint a city attorney with prosecutorial 
responsibilities to represent an indigent defendant, we conclude 
that vital interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized 
when a city prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of 
an accused. Consequently, we hold that as a matter of public 
policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the 
courts, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may 
not be appointed to defend indigent persons; therefore, we 
reverse defendant's conviction and order a new trial. 
In a later case, State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996), the Court 
characterized the Brown decision thus: 
Furthermore, our decision in Brown announced for the first time 
that counsel with concurrent prosecutorial duties could not 
represent indigent defendants, a clear change from past 
procedures. 
In Brown, we expressly declined to decide whether the 
appointment of attorneys with concurrent prosecutor/a/ duties 
was constitutionally impermissible 
The primary purpose of the prohibition in Brown was clearly 
prophylactic, that is, to forbid "such dual representation . . . so 
as to prevent its recurrence." (All emphases added), 
The reasons given by the Court for its decision in Brown are not present in this 
case. Counsel was appointed to represent an indigent defendant there; Defendant 
chose and retained his own counsel here. Appointed counsel had concurrent 
prosecutorial obligations there; Mr. Houtz had no prosecutorial function here. 
Hesitation to vigorously cross examine police officers, a "natural inclination not to 
anger the very individuals whose assistance (a prosecutor) relies upon in carrying 
out his prosecutorial responsibilities," reluctance to attack the constitutionality of 
the very laws he has sworn to uphold as a prosecutor, unconscious influences that 
may affect the judgment of an attorney with such concurrent commitments -- all 
these underlying reasons discussed by the Court in Brown are not present here. 
Even in a multiple representation case, where there is ever present the possibility 
that a conflict of interest may arise, ". . . until a defendant shows that his counsel 
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actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional 
predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 
(1980). 
If a court is put on notice of a probable risk of conflict of interest and then fails to 
appoint separate counsel, a defendant is deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed 
assistance of counsel. "Absent these special circumstances, however, a defendant 
can prevail on a conflict of interest ineffectiveness of counsel claim only by 
demonstrating an actual conflict which affected his or her attorney's performance." 
State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1996), citing State v. Webb, 790 
P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990). In Webb, the Court said, "In order to show an actual 
conflict of interest existed, a defendant must point to specific instances in the 
record to suggest an actual conflict or impairment of his or her interests. (Citations 
omitted). There is no violation where the conflict is irrelevant or merely 
hypothetical; there must be an actual, significant confl ict." 
The foregoing references and quotes are from cases in which counsel represented 
more than one defendant in charges arising out of the same incident. It is apparent 
to the Court that the potential for conflict is greater in such cases than in the 
present case. It is a fortiori, then, that if a claimed conflict is irrelevant or merely 
hypothetical in those cases unless there is a showing of actual conflict, it is 
irrelevant or merely hypothetical here. 
The Court denies Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. The Court apologizes to 
counsel for the time it has taken to get this decision worked up and mailed out. 
/ J u d g e 
